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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT- FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-EXCESSIVE BAIL-The United State Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has held that the excessive bail clause
of the eighth amendment is applicable to the states.
Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1981).
In October 1971, Edward Sistrunk was convicted in a Pennsyl-
vania state court of murder and other related offenses stemming
from a store robbery.' He received a sentence of life imprison-
ment for murder and consecutive and concurrent twenty-to-forty
year sentences for other crimes.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed the conviction and sentence.'
Sistrunk then filed a petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Post Conviction Hearing Act,' arguing that he had been ineffec-
tively represented by counsel at trial and that his constitutional
rights had been abridged by prejudicial error in the prosecutor's
closing argument.' In May 1979, the Philadelphia Court of Com-
mon Pleas granted Sistrunk a new trial.' He then requested
that bail be set pending retrial. In June 1979, a bail hearing was
held and the same court set bail at two million dollars.7 On ap-
1. Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1981). On January 4, 1971,
Sistrunk and seven accomplices staged a robbery at a furniture store during
which a man was killed, 5 fires were ignited, and several persons were
assaulted. Id. at 65.
2. Id. at 65. Sistrunk was convicted on twelve charges including first
degree murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, burglary, conspiracy, and
four counts of assault and battery with intent to murder. Id See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1102, 3701 n.4, 3502, 903-911, 2702 (Purdon 1973), respectively.
3. Commonwealth v. Sistrunk, 460 Pa. 655, 334 A.2d 280 (1975).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1-14 (Purdon Supp. 1978). The Act was
repealed by Act 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2 (2) [1397], effective June 27,
1980, as amended by Act 1980, June 26, P.L. 265, No. 77, § 2, which delayed
repeal until June 27, 1981.
5. 646 F.2d at 65. Trial counsel had failed to file a pre-trial motion to sup-
press and prevent an in-court identification of Sistrunk where the in-court iden-
tification of 2 Commonwealth Witnesses was tainted and a third witness had
identified someone else at a pre-trial line-up. This eyewitness testimony was the
only evidence linking Sistrunk to the crime.
6. 646 F.2d at 65. The court ruled that there was substantial prejudicial
error in the prosecutor's closing argument and that it violated the appellant's
sixth amendment rights. Id.
7. Id. Pennsylvania's 10% bail system required Sistrunk to deposit
$200,000 cash, or the equivalent in realty or a combination thereof, with the
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peal,8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Sistrunk's applica-
tion for a bail reduction?
. Sistrunk then filed for habeas corpus relief in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,0
alleging that the two million dollar bail violated his eighth and
fourteenth amendment rights to reasonable bail" and abridged
the presumption of innocence afforded all persons not yet con-
victed. 2 The court denied relief without a hearing on the merits. 3
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed, holding that the excessive bail provision of the
eighth amendment does apply to the states pursuant to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court, how-
ever, denied Sistrunk habeas corpus relief because it found that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have intended to deny bail,
and not set it at two million dollars."
Judge Adams, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, ex-
amined whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 5
clerk of court in order to secure release. PA. R. CRIM. P. 4006(c), (e).
8. Brief for appellee at 6 & 7. Subsequent to the original bail hearing,
Sistrunk moved to have the charges against him dismissed on double jeopardy
grounds. Relief was denied in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and
there is an appeal pending to the Pennslyvania Supreme Court, docketed at No.
398, January term, 1979. Id.
9. 646 F.2d at 65. The opinion did not give any reasons for the denial of
bail reduction, but said that this is a case where bail would be denied. Id.
10. Id. at 66. A defendant appealing the imposition of bail by a state court
must exhaust available state remedies before commencing a habeas proceeding
in the federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1977).
11. 646 F.2d at 66. The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail
shall not be required .. ", U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and the fourteenth amend-
ment that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
12. 646 F.2d at 66. Sistrunk also contended that his bail violated a policy of
equal treatment because one of his codefendants had been released on a lesser
bail.
13. The district court adopted the report and recommendation of a United
State Magistrate. The court concluded that the state trialjudge had not abused
his discretion in setting bail nor set an arbitrary or discriminatory bail in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The district court also reasoned that because
Sistrunk could be subject to the death penalty on retrial, bail could have been
denied anyway. Id.
14. Id. The order of the district court was affirmed without prejudice to
Sistrunk to seek clarification from the state courts. Id.
15. Id. Circuit Judge Sloviter and District Judge Brotman, sitting by
designation, joined in the opinion.
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The court noted that its jurisdiction hinged upon whether the
eighth amendment's guarantee against excessive bail is applica-
ble to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment."6
Judge Adams observed that since 1945, through use of the
doctrine of selective incorporation, specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights have been applied to the states through the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court observed
that although the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment has been applied to the states,"8 the
Supreme Court of the United States has never addressed the
same issue in relation to the excessive bail clause of the eighth
amendment. 9 Despite this, Judge Adams observed that, based on
historical reasons' and certain Supreme Court decisions,2 it has
been assumed that the excessive bail clause does apply to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.' He also stated that
16. Id. The federal courts have authority to consider habeas petitions of
persons in state custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1977). In order for Sistrunk to make out a
claim under section 2254, the eighth amendment excessive bail provision must
be applicable to the states.
17. In deciding which Bill of Rights provisions to incorporate, the Supreme
Court has continually rejected the theory of total incorporation and instead
searched for principles of justice so rooted in the tradition and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as "fundamental". Only the provisions of the Bill of
Rights which were basic in our system of jurisprudence were incorporated. In
the early 1960's, the courts proceeded upon the assumption that state criminal
processes bear specific characteristics and the courts asked whether given this
kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental or necessary to an Anglo-
American idea of ordered liberty. This scheme developed in an era where only
2 decades before, the Supreme Court in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), came within one vote of holding that the Bill of Rights applies complete-
ly to the states. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
376-378 (1977) and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-569 (1977).
18. 646 F.2d at 66. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the
Supreme Court held that states were bound by the eighth amendment's clause
against cruel and unusual punishment.
19. 646 F.2d at 66.
20. Id. Enforcement of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause against states is based on the presence of that prohibition in the
English Bill of Rights of 1689. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and
Louisiana v. Resweber, 32 U.S. 459 (1947). The excessive bail prohibition is also
enumerated in the ancient Bill of Rights. Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 Win. & Mary
Sess. 2, c. III, I(10) [hereinafter cited as 1 Win. & Mary].
21. See Baker v. McCollen, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) and Schilb v. Kuebel, 404
U.S. 357 (1971).
22. 646 F.2d at 67.
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because other constitutional rights aimed at keeping the innocent
from unwarranted confinement have been applied to the states,
freedom from excessive bail should also be applied because it
serves a similar function. 3
The court then noted that the Supreme Court in Duncan v.
Louisiana2" developed a set of inquiries for determining whether
a right provided by the Bill of Rights with respect to federal
criminal proceedings is also applicable through the fourteenth
amendment to similar state proceedings. Judge Adams stated
that the relevant inquiries are: (1) whether a right is among
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice upon which all
our civil and political institutions are based; (2) whether the right
is a basic one in our system of jurisprudence; and (3) whether it
is essential to a fair trial.25
Judge Adams found that the right to be free from excessive
bail met the first prong of the Duncan test.' He noted that bail
was a carefully guarded right in the American colonies' and that
the eighth amendment clause against excessive bail was immedi-
ately augmented after its adoption by a positive federal statutory
23. Id. Other rights aimed at preventing unwarranted confinement of those
not guilty are the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, which was upheld in
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), and proof of a criminal charge
beyond a reasonable doubt, upheld in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
24. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Duncan Court held that a trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and therefore
the sixth amendment right applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Without defining which criminal offenses are petty and which serious, the
Court held that any crime punishable by 2 years in prison is serious and there-
fore anyone accused of such a crime is entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 161-62.
25. 646 F.2d at 67. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49.
26. 646 F.2d at 68. This test was originally propounded in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Powell Court was addressing the issue of the
right to counsel in a criminal prosecution and deemed this right to be fun-
damental and therefore guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court also stated that one test which has been used in certain
instances is to ascertain what were the settled usages and modes of proceeding
under the command statutory law of England before the Declaration of In-
dependence; subject, however, to the qualification that they be shown not to
have been unsuited to the civil and political conditions of our ancestors by
demonstrating that they were followed in this country after it became a nation.
646 F.2d at 65.
27. 646 F.2d at 68. Early legislation replaced the English bail law of mag-
istral discretion with a positive right to bail, except in capital cases. Pennsyl-
vania created such a protection in 1682. Foote, The Coming Constitutional
Crises of Bail; I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1965).
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right to bail in all noncapital cases.28 Judge Adams observed that
although the eighth amendment does not create an absolute right
to bail, it is the foundation of the bail system and must be
carefully guarded against the diminuation of its protections.'
The court also reasoned that the excessive bail clause of the
eighth amendment also meets the second test set forth in Duncan
because it is a basic right of our jurisprudential system." In sup-
port of this conclusion, the court noted that the right to be free
from excessive bail has been a central theme throughout English
and American history.31
In applying the third test from Duncan, Judge Adams observed
it was necessary to balance the values represented and protected
by bail against the social costs and difficulties of administering
the bail system.32 The court then noted that these conflicting in-
28. 646 F.2d at 68. See First Judiciary Act of 1789, I Stat. 73, 91 contain-
ing this statutory right. Also, throughout American history, there seemed to be
a deep-rooted commitment to freedom before conviction which goes hand-in-
hand with preserving the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. See
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), which discusses this commitment as in-
herent in American law.
29. 646 F.2d at 68. Judge Adams also noted that the right to bail balances
equally the defendant's right to pre-trial freedom and society's interest in assur-
ing the defendant's presence at trial. Id.
30. Id. This criterion of a right being basic to our system of jurisprudence
is derived from In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). There the Court focused on the
traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials which it viewed mostly as
a reaction to their abuses in other cultures, such as the Spanish Inquisition. Id.
at 168-69.
31. 646 F.2d at 68-69. The Magna Carta's 39th chapter, which promised due
process safeguards for all arrests and detentions, was implemented by the Peti-
tions of Rights of 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and the Bill of Rights of
1689. These statutes grew out of cases which alleged abusive denial of freedom
or bail pending trial. The excessive bail provision was included in many state
constitutions adopted during the revolutionary period and was eventually in-
cluded in the eighth amendment. For details of American and English bail law
history, see Foote, supra note 27, at 963-69. Judge Adams compared this Anglo-
American right to be free from excessive bail with some European systems
which either do not have a bail system or rely on discretion in granting bail.
646 F.2d at 69.
32. 646 F.2d at 69. The court opined that without the bail privilege, the in-
nocent are punished by imprisonment while awaiting trial and are put at a dis-
advantage is preparing for trial. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 7-8. On the
other hand, if granted bail, the defendant may flea or intimidate witnesses.
Finally, excessive bail may penalize indigent defendants more harshly, even
though there have been steps taken to reduce the inequality faced by indigent
offenders, such as the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976), and PA.
R. CRIM. P. 4004. See 646 F.2d at 69.
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terests had been resolved in favor of admission to bail.' The
court observed that because the function of bail is to assure the
defendant's presence at trial, any amount higher than that rea-
sonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive under the
eighth amendment.,
Thus, the court concluded that bail is a fundamental liberty,
elemental to the American system of jurisprudence. The court
therefore asserted that states should respect this practice. Be-
cause our system of deterrents is based on the threat of subse-
quent punishment and not prior confinement, states should not
be permitted to use bail as a form of pre-trial punishment.'
The court stressed that the eighth amendment deals only with
the right to be free from excessive bail and not the right to bail
itself. The court found that while federal law defines "ex-
cessiveness", the states would still have the right to define the
range of offenses for which bail is discretionary.' Recognizing
the Supreme Court's admitted reluctance to involve itself with
the details of a state's bail system,37 Judge Adams observed that
the Constitution only sets a limit on the employment of bail and
does not provide a right to bail per se. Therefore, the states will
not be unduly restricted by a uniform Federal code.'
The court also rejected the argument that the excessive bail
provision should not be incorporated because the term "exces-
sive" is too vague. Judge Adams noted that other terms which
are also vague have been applied against the state and reasoned
that the employment of a subjective rather than an objective
standard is not a determinative factor in the incorporation
33. 646 F.2d at 69. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (possibility of flight
is a calculated risk which is the price of our system of justice).
34. 646 F.2d at 70. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 5.
35. 646 F.2d at 70. See also, Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79
HARV. L. REV., 1489, 1503 (1966) which observes that bail may be refuse in
order to protect the integrity of the legal system, e.g., when a defendant might
flee or intimidate witnesses. However, bail should not be refused in order to
prevent dangerous acts, for the would displace the established legal method of
prohibiting the commission of crimes.
36. 646 F.2d at 70. The court states that federal bail statutes only provide
a guideline on the right to bail.
37. See Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. at 365, in which the Court assumed the
applicability of the eighth amendment to the states but stated that the adminis-
trative detail and procedure of the bail system is hardly to be classified as a
fundamental right.
38. 646 F.2d at 71.
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analysis.2 Thus, the court held that the excessive bail provision
is binding upon the states and that therefore it did have jurisdic-
tion to hear Sistrunk's complaint.
The court then considered Sistrunk's first argument, that his
bail abridged his presumption of innocence. ' ° The court, following
the Supreme Court's holding in Bell v. Wolfish,' noted that de-
spite its important role in the criminal justice system, the pre-
sumption of innocence is not a source of substantive rights and
does not provide adequate footing for a habeas petition.42
Judge Adams rejected Sistrunk's second contention that he suf-
fered discrimination because co-defendants received lesser bail.
He noted that bail is an individualized determination and the fact
that co-defendants had bail set in a lower amount, without more,
is insufficient evidence to established discrimination.43
Finally, the court examined Sistrunk's argument that his two
million dollar bail is excessive and violative of the eighth amend-
ment. The court noted that the Supreme Court has defined ex-
cessive bail as one set at a figure higher than that reasonably
calculated to assure defendant's presence at trial.4 However, the
court cautioned that in a habeas corpus proceeding, federal-state
comity mandates some degree of certainty that a federal consti-
tutional right has been violated before granting relief.
Judge Adams concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
either intended to deny bail altogether, considered two million
dollars not to be excessive because bail could have been denied,
or determined that two million dollars was not excessive under
the circumstances of the case.45 The court decided that because a
39. Id. Other terms which are also vague but which, the court notes, apply
to the states are "unreasonable" searches and seizures and "cruel and unusual"
punishment.
40. Id.
41. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Bell Court stated that despite the importance
of the presumption of innocence in our system, "it has no application to a deter-
mination of the rights of a pre-trial detainee during confinement before his trial
has ever begun." Id. at 533.
42. 646 F.2d at 71.
43. Id. at 72. The court based this conclusion on Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951).
44. 646 F.2d at 72. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
45. 646 F.2d at 73. The court observed that the trial court had found that
the defendant did have a right to bail, while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
said that bail should be denied in this case but allowed the two million dollar
bail to stand anyway.
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plausible reading could be placed on the state proceedings, it
would not disturb the state criminal system through its review
role in a habeas corpus proceeding.46 The court recognized that
such an interpretation allowed it to avoid resolving Sistrunk's
contention of excessiveness.47
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sloviter agreed that the eighth
amendment's prohibition of excessive bail does apply to the
states and the habeas corpus could constitutionally decide that
Sistrunk had no right to bail.48
Bail is the releasing of a person charged with an offense, sub-
ject to the insurance that he will appear in court."9 The excessive
bail clause of the eighth amendment was adopted almost verba-
tim from section nine of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776 which in turn was derived from the English Bill of Rights of
1689.5
The first statutory regulation of bail was a 13th century
English act,5' which sought to curb abuses by the Sheriff, who
had broad and discretionary powers to bail the King's prisoners,
by enumerating which offenses were bailable and which were
46. The court held that the first interpretation that the state intended to
deny bail has a basis in Pennsylvania constitutional law. According to PA. CONST.
art. 1 § 14, because Sistrunk could have received the death penalty, he has no
right to bail, although he could be admitted to bail at the discretion of the
court. The court noted, however, that even though this interpretation would
change the extent of the sentence and the defendant's state constitutional
rights on retrial, the question is one of state law and not the province of a
federal court to re-examine on a habeas petition. Judge Adams observed that in
Pennsylvania a defendant is sentenced to a non-capital penalty, he may not
receive a capital sentence on re-trial. 646 F.2d at 73.
47. 646 F.2d at 73. Judge Adams observed that because Sistrunk failed to
file a motion for clarification in the state court, he could not now expect the
court to speculate that the Pennslyvania Supreme Court's order was other than
a denial of bail. Id.
48. Id. (Sloviter, J., concurring).
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Whether bail is a
"basic human right" and the eighth amendment excessive bail provision en-
forces this right or whether bail is onlV an important statutory right will not be
discussed in this note. Two opposing views on this subject can be found in U.S.
v. Edwards, - Pa. ___ 430 A.2d 1321 (1981) and Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148
(1981).
50. See 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49
(W. Swindler ed. 1979) for the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, and 1 Wm.
& Mary, supra note 20, for the English Bill of Rights.
51. The Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15 Q (1275).
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not.52 The statute, however, did not bind the higher justices nor
the King, and Parliament was free to redefine which crimes were
bailable." When the Stewarts exploited defects in the law to
deny release to particular prisoners, further limitations on dis-
cretion to grant bail were enacted.' One of these was the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679.11 When the protections of the Habeas Corpus
Act were circumvented by the practice of setting prohibitively
high bail, an excessive bail clause was drafted into the Bill of
Rights of 1689. The excessive bail clause was developed as a spe-
cific remedy for judicial abuse of the bail procedure as otherwise
established by law and did not imply any right to bail.'
Many courts have assumed that the excessive bail clause of
the eighth amendment applies to the states through the four-
teenth amendment without utilizing any type of constitutional in-
corporation analysis. In Schilb v. Kuebel, the United States
Supreme Court assumed that the excessive bail clause applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, noting that bail is
basic to our system of law.' The Schilb Court cited two other
cases as precedent, although neither case actually decided the
excessive bail issue.59 The Court also noted that it was not con-
cerned with any fundamental right to bail or the question of ex-
cessive bail.'
As a result of the Supreme Court's pronouncement, many fed-
eral courts, in answering bail questions from the states, also
52. See U.S. v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1326.
53. Id. at 1327. See also Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42
ALB. L. REv. 33 (1977), for an overall history of the English bail system.
54. See U.S. v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1327.
55. Id. See also Duker, supra note 53, at 65 & 66.
56. U.S. v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1327.
57. 404 U.S. 357 (1971). The Shilb Court ruled that the Illinois bail system
procedure of retaining 1% of the 10% bail deposit did not violate equal protec-
tion or due process.
58. Id. at 365.
59. Id. One case cited was Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir.
1963), in which the court stated that they took for granted that earlier cases
such as Ex Parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833) and Collins v. Johnston,
237 U.S. 502 (1915), were now to be overruled, but never supported this conclu-
sion. Another case cited was Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which
dealt with the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
and not excessive bail.
60. 404 U.S. at 365.
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have been applying the eighth amendment excessive bail provi-
sion without actually reaching the incorporation issue."
The Fifth Circuit in Simon v. Woodson 2 noted that that cir-
cuit' and the Eighth Circuit" are committed to the proposition
that the eighth amendment prohibition of excessive bail is bind-
ing on the states. 5 The court, however, held that because the ap-
pellant would have no constitutional relief even if the state of
Texas were bound by the eighth amendment, it was inappropri-
ate and unnecessary to expound on the excessive bail clause's ap-
plicability to the states."
In United States v. Kehl, 7 the Second Circuit began its
analysis by noting that the excessive bail provision of the eighth
amendment has not yet been held by the Supreme Court to be
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, but
stated that it had little doubt that it will be.'
The Sistrunk court followed the accepted constitutional theory
that those provisions of the Bill of Rights that are fundamental
to the American system of law should be applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.69
61. See United States v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Good-
iene v. Griffin, 309 F. Supp. 590 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Hernandez v. Heyd, 307 F.
Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. Caparo, 297 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); United States v. Follette, 290 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v.
Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd 408 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1969); Wansley
v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Va. 1967).
62. See 454 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1972). The Simon court reversed an order
from a Texas federal district court which granted habeas corpus relief on a find-
ing that bail set by the state was excessive. The court ruled that the only issue
to be decided was whether the state judge had acted arbitrarily in setting bail.
Id.
63. The Fifth Circuit precedent was a six-word footnote in Henderson v.
Dutton, 397 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1968); the text read, "The Constitution prohibits
the state from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment," a footnote added: "and
undoubtedly excessive bail as well." Id. n.3.
64. The precedent cited from the Eighth Circuit was Pilkinton v. Circuit
Court, 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1963). See supra note 59.
65. 454 F.2d at 165.
66. Id.
67. 456 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1972). The Kehl court ruled that a federal district
court erred in granting relief upon a habeas corpus petition where a radio sta-
tion manager was sentenced to 30 days for contempt for not releasing tape
recordings and the court noted he would be released sooner if he complied.
68. Id.
69. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW at 376, 377 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. The most recent standard
[Vol. 20:637
Recent Decisions
The Sistrunk court applied the most recent constitutional ra-
tionale on incorporation, the accepted standard for selective in-
corporation set forth in Duncan. In holding that the eighth
amendment excessive bail clause, which for all practical purposes
had been treated as if incorporated already," shall be incorpo-
rated into the fourteenth amendment, Sistrunk v. Lyons was a
logical step into setting sounder precedent for future application
of the excessive bail provision."
The Sistrunk decision incorporating the excessive bail clause
of the eighth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment was a predictable step premised on accepted consti-
tutional principles and left the court with jurisdiction to hear
this particular appeal, if the Pennsylvania courts decided bail
was not being denied, and future habeas appeals on excessive
bail issues from state courts.
Matt Curiale
for incorporation of a provision into the fourteenth amendment is developed in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1969). See NOWAK, supra note 69, at 376 n.7.
70. See NOWAK, supra note 69, at 377.
71. Whether the excessive bail provision of the eighth amendment grants a
constitutional right to bail in a criminal case has never been decided in the
federal courts. The Sistrunk court takes the position that the Constitution does
not provide a right to bail per se to which the states must confirm, it only sets
a ceiling on its employment. 646 F.2d at 71.
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